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Abstract— The monitoring process consists in evaluating the
behaviour of nodes in networks in order to detect if the
monitored nodes well-behave or misbehave. Many existing so-
lutions deal the problem at each layer separately. Actually new
kinds of misbehaviour attacks are cross-layer. So, such smart
misbehaviours cannot be detected at the level of one layer. In
this paper, we propose a new cross-layer approach based on
physical, MAC and routing layers for a monitoring mechanism.
An analytical model is proposed to illustrate the parameters’
effect on these different layers. The impact of the Signal to
Noise Rate (SNR), the distance between monitor and monitored
nodes are clearly introduced. Moreover, the difference between
the carrier sense, the interference and the transmission ranges is
taken into account in our model. The simulations’ results show
the effectiveness of the proposed analytical model, we reach until
90% of observation’s correction in some cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
The detection of a certain type of misbehaviour nodes in
Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs) is one of the hardest
issues. Misbehaviour means deviation from the regular activity
of nodes, for example routing and forwarding. It arises because
of several reasons, non-intentionally when a node is faulty
or doesn’t have any plan to attack any node in a network.
Intentional misbehaviour can aim at taking advantage (like
intercepting the network traffic, saving its power, increasing
its bandwidth . . . etc) or just at constituting some damage
in a network. Without any detection system of misbehaviour
nodes, the result effects of misbehaviour have shown that they
dramatically decreased the performance of the network [1]
and produced the denial of service (DoS). In order to solve
the problem, many recent works proposed the solution based
on the preventive aspect, for example secure a routing using
cryptography such as Ariadne or SRP [2] and ARAN protocols
[3]. Although these solutions are limited in an open network,
for example the unknown nodes can arrive in the network,
the problem is how to protect the confident nodes against
prospective attacks from unknown nodes. That’s why we need
to monitor the behaviour of nodes in a network. A recent
research work was dealing with the reputation system based
on the observation of the reaction of monitored nodes [2].
For example a watchdog solution based on packets forwarding
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to detect the non-forwarding nodes [4]. The definition of the
monitoring process is the set of actions that are useful to
supervise the nodes’ behaviour. These actions depend on the
services which we want to monitor (routing, authentication,
integrity, . . . ). The major problem of a current proposal of
monitoring process like watchdog for example is that it doesn’t
take into account some characteristics of MANETs.
In this paper, we study the monitoring process to maintain
the security in Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs). The
impact of physical and MAC’s parameters protocols on the
monitoring mechanisms on MANETs are investigated. The
distributed coordination function (DCF) mode in IEEE 802.11
is taken as an example. We analyze different situations of
monitor and monitored nodes (a distance between them, a
transmission time duration, a transmission probability, . . . ).
Furthermore, we propose a new analytical model which takes
into account the physical layer’s parameters, the MAC layer’s
parameters and routing layer’s parameters like a forwarding
process. The model proposed improves the evaluation of the
nodes’ cooperation and clearly distinguishes nodes which can
not and those which don’t want to cooperate correctly.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2,
we introduce our motivation and the problematic in monitoring
process. In section 3, we describe the network assumption and
a model. In section 4, we present the analytic and simulation
results of a proposed model. The last section is the conclusion
and we also present our future works.
II. MOTIVATION
In MANETs, all the mobile nodes don’t have the same
information of their neighbours, because the characteristics
of MANETs like dynamic topology and the hidden nodes
complicate the problem of monitoring. If we only based on
the monitoring process at the network level, for example the
rate of packets forwarded, we would take the risk of get a false
estimation of the monitored nodes’ reputation. That’s why we
adopt a cross-layer approach to design the monitoring process.
When a monitor node wants to supervise the behaviour of
its neighbours, it needs to know some important piece of
information like the number of nodes in the interference
range, the throughput and delay in the neighbourhood of the
monitored nodes.
When the monitor node A wants to monitor a node B
which is its neighbour, the node A doesn’t have any piece
of information about the environment of the monitored node
B, if a node C is located in the interference range of the node
B and cannot be heard by the monitor node A. The node C can
reduce the reputation of the node B by generating an important
traffic to an other node out of a sensing region of the node A
and prevent the monitored node B from communicating and
forwarding packets. In this event, the monitor node A gives
a low estimation of the node B’s reputation and classes the
node B as non-cooperative.
In order to avoid this problem, the monitor node needs to
know the MAC layer’s parameters of its monitored neighbours.
We conclude that the presence of an important traffic of nodes
in the interference range of the monitored nodes and out of
the carrier senses of the monitor nodes can punish the well-
behaving nodes and disturb the monitoring process.
The monitoring process proposed by Marti et al. [4], called
Watchdog, is based on the network level; it didn’t take into
account the physical or the MAC level’s parameters. The
idea is that the monitor node can listen to the traffic of its
neighbours, and detect if the monitored nodes forward the
packets in the event of a routing procedure. The Watchdog’s
weaknesses are that it might not detect a misbehaving node
in the presence of 1) monitor/monitored collisions, 2) limited
transmission power, 3) false misbehaviour.
The monitor nodes can generate a false evaluation of the
monitored nodes’ cooperation in these following events:
• The case of a monitor collision: the monitor node can get
a collision because some nodes transmit in its interference
region but not in the sensing region of the monitored
nodes; in this situation, the monitored node can forward
the packets (subject of monitoring) but the monitor node
cannot hear them. Therefore, the monitor node doesn’t
take into account these forwarding operations, that means
the reputation reported is underestimated by the monitor
node.
• The case of a monitored collision: the monitored node
can have more collisions than a monitor node because
it has many competing nodes that want to have access
to the channel in its sensing range. In this case, the
monitored node cannot transmit the packets, although it
doesn’t refuse to forward them. That’s why, the monitor
node needs to know what is going on in the hidden region
(sensing region of the monitored node but not of the
monitor node).
• The case concerning the presence of malicious nodes:
the presence of any malicious node in the common inter-
ference region of monitor and monitored nodes doesn’t
affect the monitoring process because both nodes (moni-
tor and monitored ones) have the same observation in this
region. The problem occurs when the malicious nodes are
present in the interference region of the monitored nodes
and cannot be heard by the monitor one.
The goal of this work is to study the monitoring process
in the different cases, monitor/monitored collision and false
misbehaviour.
III. MONITORING MODEL
A. Network model and assumption
This subsection deals with the assumptions and the network
model used in the analysis described below.
• Spacial distribution of nodes: we assume that nodes are
distributed within topology which is a two-dimensional
Poisson process’s with parameter λ (memoryless property
of Poisson distribution).
• The transmission range (Rt): all nodes have the same
transmission range (Rt). This means that nodes within a
circle of radius Rt centred at the transmitter may be able
to receive correct packets.
• The Carrier sensing range (Rs): the range inside which
nodes are able to sense the signal, even though a correct
packet reception may not be possible (it may not be able
to decode the received packet correctly).
• The interference range (Ri): the range inside which any
new transmission may interfere with the packet reception.
The Ri depends on the distance between a transmitter and
a receiver (d) and the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) which
must be above a certain threshold TSNR to consider if
the signal is valid at the receiver or not. The Ri is defined
by,
Ri = k
√
TSNR ∗ d
In practice, under the TWO-RAY GROUND model (open
space environnement), k is equal to 4. The TSNR is usully
set to 10. Then, the interference range is Ri = 4
√
10∗d =
1.78 ∗ d [5].
• The average number of nodes within a sensing range,
an interference range and a transmission range with a
radius Rs, Ri and Rt respectively is Nj ≈ λpiR2j where
j = {s, i, t} [6].
• The probability that a node transmits in a randomly time
slot is noted by τ which is independent on any time slot.
The slot time size, σ, is set equal to the time needed
by any node to detect the transmission of a packet from
any other node. The transmission time Tp of a packet is
assumed to be the same for all nodes. The number of slot
times γ necessary to transmit a packet is (γ = Tp/σ).
Like [7] we assume that the duration of the successful
packet transmission (RTS/CTS mode) is
Tall = Trts + Tcts + Tdata + Tack + 4σ
According to the assumptions quoted above, the relation
between the carrier sensing range, the interference range and
the transmission range is Rt < Ri < Rs where Rs = δRt, in
some network simulator, like ns2 δ = 2.2 [11].
B. The different hidden areas
The figure 1 illustrates the hidden sensing region and the
hidden transmission region of two neighbour nodes A and B.
The CSAB(r) (IRAB(r)) is the sensing region of the node
A but not the sensing region of the node B (the interference
Fig. 1. The different hidden regions, CSAB , IRAB and TRAB
region of the node A but not the interference region of the node
B). If any node in CSAB(r) transmits, the signal can be sensed
by the node A but not by the node B. The difference between
CSAB(r) and IRAB(r) is seen when a node in the region
IRAB(r) transmits, it can create a collision in a receiver node
A but it is not the case for the nodes in region CSAB(r).
TRAB(r) is the transmission region of the node A but not the
transmission region of the node B, that means the nodes in
TRAB(r) can receive the packets correctly from the node A
but it can not from the node B.
The difference between IRAB(r) and TRAB(r) is the prob-
lem of the hidden nodes, in TRAB(r) this problem is resolved
by the RTS/CTS mechanism in IEEE 802.11 but in IRAB(r)
the RTS/CTS mechanism cannot resolve this problem because
the nodes in this region cannot decode the packets correctly
when the node A transmits RTS/CTS/DATA/ACT. When a
node senses a signal but cannot decode it, that means it cannot
calculate a NAV (Network Allocation Vector), that’s why it
uses the EIFS (Extended Inter-Frame Spaces)1 [10]. The IEEE
802.11 does not completely prevent from collisions due to a
hidden node in the sensing region.
In the context of monitoring process, we assume that the
node A monitors the node B. In order to get some piece of
information about a cooperation with the node B, the node A
transmits a few packets to it, so that it forwards them. After
the monitor A has observed the behaviour of the node B, it
generates the report about the forwarding rate. In this work,
we focus on the region CSAB(r), IRAB(r) and the region
TRAB(r) because these regions have important effects on the
monitoring process. In the figure 1, when a node A monitors a
node B, the node A cannot see what is happening in the region
TRBA(r) (transmission region of the node B and not of the
node A), the problem is that the monitor node A is unable to
know if the node B doesn’t want or if it can not transmit
because the number of competition nodes in TRBA(r) is
great. Another problem occurs in the monitoring process, in
the interference region of the monitor node A and out of the
carrier sense of the monitored node [IRA − CSB ]. When a
1The EIFS is estimated at 364µs when using a 1 Mbps channel bit rate
monitor A has a collision because a few nodes in IRAB(r)
transmit, when a node B forwards a packet that it received
from a node A, in this situation the node A is unable to know
if the node B has successfully forwarded a packet or not. Thus,
the monitor node A underestimated the forwarding ratio of the
node B.
The regions TRAB(r) and CSAB(r) depend on the trans-
mission range (Rt) and the sensing range (Rs) respectively and
(d) is a distance between nodes A and B. We can formulate
these regions by the equation 1:
CSAB(r) = piR2s − 2R2sq(r/2Rs) where, r < Rs
TRAB(r) = piR2t − 2R2t q(r/2Rt) where, r < Rt (1)
where q(t) = arcos(t)− t√(1− t2) and Rs = αRt
Fig. 2. The impact of a distance on the interference and the hidden areas
Figure 2 shows an example of two neighbour nodes A and
B with a different distance between them. Let r be the distance
between two neighbour nodes A and B. In the case (a), the
distance between node A and node B is greater than in the
case (b), which means that the interference region and the
region TRBA(r) in the case (a) is greater than in the case
(b). When a node A comes closer to a node B, the region
TRBA(r) becomes smaller and the interference region can
be covered by the transmission area when the r ≤ Rt4√TSNR .
The average number of nodes in the region TRBA(r) depends
on the distribution of the nodes and the mobility model. The
greater a region TRBA(r) is, the bigger the probability to get
a certain number (k) of nodes in this region is. The probability
to get k nodes in the area TRBA(r) is noted p(k, TRBA(r))
and obtained by:
p(k, TRBA(r)) = e−λTRBA(r)
(λTRBA(r))k
k!
(2)
This analysis is valid for the CSBA(r) and IRBA(r) because
it’s proportional to the distance r.
Remark: The monitoring process is more accurate when
the monitor node A is close to the monitored node B, because
the hidden region of the monitor TRBA(r) becomes small. As
TRBA(r), IRBA(r) and CSBA(r) are proportional to r, when
r is small, these areas are small and the probability to get a
node in these regions is small, the carrier sense of a monitor
node can also cover the interference region of a monitored
node. Furthermore, the interference area can be covered by the
transmission region when r ≤ 0.56∗Rt. Thus, the probability
to have a disturbance in the observation is small when the
monitor node is close to the monitored node.
Therefore, before the monitor node generates the reputation
report of the monitored node which is in its transmitting range,
it needs to know that the event which disturbs the observation
occurs and also to estimate the throughput of the monitored
node. The accuracy of this information depends on the distance
between monitor node A and monitored node B.
Fig. 3. An illustration of different vulnerable regions in the monitoring
process
Figure 3 illustrates the interference region of a node C
that is out of the sensing region of a monitored node B
(AS1S2(dBC)) where the distance between both nodes is dBC .
The AS1S2(dBC) is a vulnerable region when a monitored
node B transmits a packet to a node C. Furthermore, the
vulnerable region of a monitor node A is the interference
region of a monitor node A that is out of the sensing region
of a monitored node B (AS3S4(dAB)), where the dAB is the
distance between monitor node A and monitored node B. The
AS3S4(dAB) can have a negative impact on the monitor node’s
observation.
Any disturbing event in the monitoring process occurs
”when a monitored node transmits successfully, and at least
one node in the interference region of the monitor node and
out of the sensing region of the monitored node transmits at
the same time”. In other words, the monitor node can correctly
monitor its neighbour, if the following two conditions are met,
• Condition 1: The monitored node transmits successfully
a packet to another node of its neighbourhood.
• Condition 2: The monitor node can correctly hear the
transmission of a monitored node. No node in the inter-
ference region of a monitor node and out of the sensing
region of a monitored node (AS3S4(dAB)) transmits.
The monitor node needs to estimate the probability that the
condition 1 and 2 are met, in order to calculate the probability
that the monitor node correctly observes the monitored node
when it transmits. This probability is noted Pw.
Pw = P{condition 1}.P{condition 2} (3)
The probability of condition 1 is defined as a successful pack-
ets’ transmission of the monitored nodes noted Psucc. Psucc
may give us information about the ability of the monitored
nodes to transmit packets. However, the probability that a
monitor node gets Psucc of the monitored node is small,
because it cannot see what happens in the whole sensing region
of the monitored node, particularly in region CSBA(dAB).
According to the assumptions quoted above, the monitor node
A can estimate the average number of nodes in the region
CSBA(dAB), but another problem has to be solved is the
traffic load in this region. Two main cases appear. The first one:
the traffic is intensive, that means that all nodes have a packet
to transmit (saturated case). In this case, many researches
have been carried out in order to calculate Psucc with the
assumption that Rt = Ri = Rs [8] [6], but as far as we
know no work took into account the difference between the
transmission, the interference and the carrier sense ranges.
The second case (non-saturated case): the nodes have or not
packets to transmit, that depends on the probability that nodes
have a packet to transmit q. In order to calculate the Psucc in
this case a few researches have been carried out like Malone
et al. [9] but they didn’t take into account the difference
between Rt, Ri and Rs. In the second case, the monitor node
A can not correctly estimate the Psucc, it needs a cooperation
with a monitored node’s neighbors which overlaps the region
CSBA(dBA).
In order to calculate Pw, we distinguish two different
situations, the saturated case and the non-saturated case. In
this work, we focus on the saturated case.
C. Saturate case
In this case, the estimated nodes in each region are the
competiting nodes which want to have access to the channel.
The probability of condition 2 gives us information about
the observation disruption of a monitor node. This probability
is obtained by the assessment of the probability that any node
in region AS3S4(dAB) transmits (P{cond.2}) in a vulnerable
period. This period depends on the transmission time of a
packet Tall, when a node B starts to transmit at ts the
vulnerable time interval is [ts − Tall − 1, ts + Tall − 1].
The nodes in region AS3S4(dAB) must remain silent during
the µ slots time where µ = (Tall/σ), because a node in
sensing and interference range waits for a EIFS when it can
not calculate a NAV vector. If EIFS is greater than a Tall,
the packet can be received correctly by the receiver node C.
Otherwise, a packet can not be correctly received. The region
AS3S4(dAB) can be equal to zero when it is covered by the
carrier sense of a node B. Thus, the P{cond.2}(dAB) in the
case of dAB > Rs1+ k√TSNR is given by,
P{cond.2}(dAB) =
( ∞∑
k=0
(1− τ)k (Nh)
k
k!
e−Nh
)
= e−τNh.µ
where, Nh = λAS3S4(dAB).
The final equation of P{cond.2}(dAB) is obtained by,
P{cond.2}(dAB) =
{
1 if dAB ≤ Rs1+ k√TSNR
e−τNh.µ Otherwise
(4)
In order to calculate AS3S4(dAB), we calculate the area of
intersection of sensing region and interference region of two
nodes X and Y; the distance between them both is d.
Ar{XTY }(d) = Rs(arccos(α)− α√1− α2) +
Ri(arccos(β)− β
√
1− β2)
where α = R
2
s −R2i + d2
2dRs
and β = R
2
i −R2s + d2
2dRi
Therefore, the AS3S4(dAB) is expressed by,
AS3S4(dAB) =
{
0 if dAB ≤ Rs1+ k√TSNR
piR2s −Ar{ATB}(dAB) Otherwise
If AS1S2(dBC) = 0, that means that the carrier sensing region
of a node B overlaps the interference region of a node C and
no node transmits.
Now, from equations 3 and 4, we can calculate Pw(dAB)
as follows:
Pw(dAB) =
{
Psucc if dAB ≤ Rs1+ k√TSNR
Psucc.e
−τNh.µ Otherwise
(5)
The reputation report of the monitored node (B) generated
by the monitor node (A) is given by,
RA,B(dAB) = η.Pw(dAB) (6)
where η is the forwarding ratio observed by a monitor node,
η =
(#forwarded packets
#total sent packets
)
The predictable forwarding packets of any monitored node
depends on its reputation calculated by monitor nodes and the
total number of packets it forwards.
#Forwarded packets = R∗(A,B).(#total sent packets).Pw (7)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present the results of our model in
different situations ; when the distance between monitor and
monitored nodes is different and also the impact of the
transmission probability τ .
The figure 4 shows the hidden area AS3S4 according to the
distance between nodes A and B with 550m of sensing range
and interference Ri = 4
√
10.dAB . When the distance between
nodes is less than 200m the AS3S4 = 0, that means the region
AS3S4 is covered by the sensing region of a node B in the
case of Ri = 1.78.dAB . When the sensibility of a signal is
great the interference range becomes greater and the region
AS3S4 becomes less covered by the sensing region of a node
B as shows in the figure 4 when Ri = 1.90.dAB .
The figure 5 illustrates the probability that any node in the
region As3s4(d) transmits during the slot time µ = 1.σ. We
remark that the probability P{cond.2} equals to one when
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
x 105
Distance between a node A and a node B: d (m)
A S
3S
4:
 (m
xm
)
R
s
=2.2Rt and Rt=250m
Ri=1.60xd
Ri=1.78xd
Ri=1.90xd
Fig. 4. The hidden area AS3S4 versus distance between nodes A and B
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Distance between monitor and monitored nodes: d (m)
P c
o
n
d.
2
Rs=2.2Rt, Ri=1.78d, Rt=250m and µ=1σ
τ=0.2
τ=0.4
τ=0.8
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the distance between A and B is less than 200 meter, due to
the region As3s4(d) which is overlapped by the sensing region
of a node B. However, when the distance between a node A
and a node B becomes greater the P{cond.2}(d) decreases
and it decreases rapidly when the probability of transmission
τ is great. The figure 6 shows the P{cond.2}(d) when a
transmission duration µ is great (µ = 5σ), we note that the
P{cond.2}(d) is smaller than in the case of time duration
µ = σ. We can conclude that the threshold TSNR, the distance
between monitor and monitored nodes and the transmission
time µ have an important impact on the monitoring process.
Figure 7 shows the probability that a monitor node A
correctly receives the transmission from a monitored node B,
that means a node A doesn’t have a collision because no node
in region As3s4(dAB) transmits. We note the degradation of
the monitor’s observation when the distance between monitor
and monitored nodes is great. In this case, the degradation of
the monitor’s observation can reach until 40%. Furthermore,
the figure 8 and 9 illustrate the impact of the transmission
probability τ and the number of slots time µ on the monitor’s
observation. The worst case occurs when the distance between
monitor and monitored nodes is great and the probabilities of
transmission τ and µ are great, and the degradation of the
monitor’s observation can reach until 95%.
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V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have developed an analytical model for
a monitor node in order to correctly evaluate the reputation
and cooperation of a monitored node. The impact of the
Signal to Noise Rate (SNR) and the distance between monitor
and monitored nodes is clearly introduced, the monitor’s best
observation is when the monitor is close to the monitored
node. In our model, the difference between transmission,
interference and sensing ranges is taken into account, unlike
many modellings which assume that sensing and transmission
ranges are the same. Furthermore, with a cross-layer approach
(Physical, MAC and routing layers) adopted for our model to
get an accurate evaluation of a monitored node, we can correct
until 90% of a monitor’s observations.
One possible direction for a future work is to extend our
model to the non-saturated case [9] and improve the watchdog
process [4] by integrating our model.
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